CONDUIT TICKET REPORT

Finding Summary

Short description

[TITAN] Critical — security on role-finops-admin

Severity

Critical

Priority

1 - Critical

Resource

role-finops-admin

Resource type

AWS::IAM::Role

Cloud

AWS

Subscription / Account

450367038821

Resource group / Project

global

The Security Finding

IAM role 'role-finops-admin' has AdministratorAccess managed policy attached — overly broad privilege for a finance operations role. Privilege escalation path if role is assumed by compromised identity.

ITIL Change Management Fields

Justification

Severity assessment: CRITICAL — active exploit path, 0-day or internet-exposed asset. Meets ITIL 'security emergency' threshold.
Regulatory driver: NIST obligation.
Risk if deferred: Per industry telemetry, mean time to exploit a publicly-reachable misconfiguration of this class is measured in hours. Delaying this change extends exposure window and increases breach cost per IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report (avg $4.45M per incident).

Detected by: TITAN AI agent unknown (scan titan-killer-20260421T222654Z).
Finding: IAM role 'role-finops-admin' has AdministratorAccess managed policy attached — overly broad privilege for a finance operations role. Privilege escalation path if role is assumed by compromised identity.

Implementation Plan

1. PRE-CHANGE VERIFICATION (5 min)
   - Confirm TITAN pre-scan snapshot captured; snapshot ID in work notes.
   - Confirm no blocking dependencies (check 'Affected CIs' below).
   - Announce change start in #ops-change Slack channel.

2. APPLY FIX (primary command, auto-generated by TITAN):
   aws iam detach-role-policy --role-name role-finops-admin --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess; aws iam attach-role-policy --role-name role-finops-admin --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::450367038821:policy/FinOpsReadOnly

3. POST-CHANGE VERIFICATION (5 min)
   - Re-run TITAN targeted scan on the affected resource.
   - Confirm finding cleared (scan returns 0 matches for this finding_id).
   - Smoke-test dependent applications (see Test plan).

4. CLOSE
   - Update ticket state to Review -> Closed.
   - Attach scan-diff evidence (pre vs post).
   - If verification fails at step 3, execute Backout plan immediately.

Risk & Impact Analysis

Change risk level: HIGH (change risk: severity overrides defer-ability)

Blast radius: The change is scoped to a single cloud resource (IAM role 'role-finops-admin' has AdministratorAccess managed policy attached — o...). Downstream dependencies (if any) are listed under 'Affected CIs'.

Applying this fix during business hours is acceptable given exploit exposure.

Worst-case failure mode: Change is rejected by the cloud API (network partition or permission drift). Impact: no state change on target resource; Backout plan is a no-op. Time to detect: immediate (non-zero exit code from fix command).

Residual risk after successful fix: zero — the finding no longer exists. TITAN verifies this via post-change scan (see Implementation plan step 3).

Backout / Rollback Plan

If post-change verification fails or the fix causes a service disruption:

1. IMMEDIATE: Revert the resource to its pre-change state using the TITAN pre-scan snapshot (snapshot ID recorded in work notes at scan time).
2. Azure:  az <resource-type> update ... (inverse of the apply command) OR az deployment group create --template-uri <pre-change ARM URI>
3. AWS:    aws <service> ... (restore from snapshot or inverse IAM policy)
4. GCP:    gcloud <service> ... update --rollback
5. Confirm rollback succeeded by re-running TITAN scan — the original finding should reappear (confirming the state was fully reverted).
6. Document the failure mode in 'Close notes' for the post-incident review.
7. Re-open this change with 'Rejected' disposition and spawn a parent Problem ticket for root-cause analysis.

Test Plan

Acceptance criteria (must all PASS to close this change):

[ ] TITAN targeted re-scan of IAM role 'role-finops-admin' has AdministratorAccess managed... returns ZERO matches for this finding_id.
[ ] Resource remains in provisioning_state=Succeeded (Azure) / available (AWS) / RUNNING (GCP) immediately after change.
[ ] Dependent applications pass smoke tests (HTTP 200 on health endpoints, auth still works for service accounts, DB connection-strings unchanged).
[ ] No new alerts raised in Azure Monitor / CloudWatch / Cloud Monitoring in the 30 minutes following the change.
[ ] Audit chain entry written: agent.change.applied event with pre/post hashes.

Any FAIL triggers the Backout plan above. Evidence attached to 'Closure Information' tab.

Recommended Fix

aws iam detach-role-policy --role-name role-finops-admin --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess; aws iam attach-role-policy --role-name role-finops-admin --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::450367038821:policy/FinOpsReadOnly

Compliance Mapping

Routing Metadata

Assignment group

identity_and_access

Change type

Normal

Approval required

Yes

Planned start

2026-04-21 16:26:56

Planned end

2026-04-21 20:26:56

Scan ID

titan-killer-20260421T222654Z

Generated at

2026-04-21T22:26:56.511021+00:00

Opened

2026-04-21 15:26:56

Closed

2026-04-21 15:26:56

Close code

—

Attached Security Ticket

IAM role 'role-finops-admin' has AdministratorAccess managed policy attached — overly broad privilege for a finance operations role. Privilege escalation path if role is assumed by compromised identity.

Recommended Fix: aws iam detach-role-policy --role-name role-finops-admin --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess; aws iam attach-role-policy --role-name role-finops-admin --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::450367038821:policy/FinOpsReadOnly

AI Close Notes

(awaiting close)